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The Role of the Amygdala in Signaling
Prospective Outcome of Choice
be demonstrated with a mundane example: if a traffic
light turns yellow when we reach an intersection, we
have to choose whether to stop, as required by law, or
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to cross the intersection. Making a choice in this case1Wohl Institute for Advanced Imaging
depends not only on knowing the traffic rules (i.e., theTel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center
value of options), but also on our willingness to ignore6 Weizmann Street
them and take a risk (i.e., the value of outcome). In thisTel Aviv 64239
case, either stopping at the yellow light (i.e., wasting2 Sackler Faculty of Medicine
time but obeying the law) or crossing the intersection3 School of Computer Science
(i.e., saving time but risking negative consequences) willSackler Faculty of Exact Sciences
be accompanied by a characteristic affective response.Tel Aviv University
Based on lesion studies in animals and humans, itRamat Aviv
has been suggested that an intact amygdala is essentialTel Aviv 69978
for making motivational (i.e., affective) choices. In ani-Israel
mals, studies using reinforced goal-directed behavioral4 Division of Neurosurgery and
paradigms showed that lesions to the amygdala inter-Department of Psychiatry and
fere with learning to avoid an aversive outcome (Davis,Biobehavioral Sciences
1992; LeDoux, 1996, 1998; Killcross et al., 1997;University of California, Los Angeles
Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999), and with adjustment toLos Angeles, California 90095
varying values of reinforcement (monkeys: Malkova et
al., 1997; rats: Hatfield et al., 1996). In humans, it was
shown that a lesion to the medial temporal lobe inter-Summary
feres with affective choice behavior, as indicated by the
lack of a conditioned skin conductance response (SCR)Can brain activity reveal a covert choice? Making a
to visual stimuli paired with aversive sounds (LaBar etchoice often evokes distinct emotions that accompany
al., 1995, 1998). More specifically, patients with bilateraldecision processes. Amygdala has been implicated
amygdala damage did not develop anticipatory SCRsin choice behavior that is guided by a prospective
when they faced a risky choice or following a negativenegative outcome. However, its specific involvement
outcome during a gambling task (Bechara et al., 1995,in emotional versus cognitive processing of choice
1999). People and animals with bilateral amygdala dam-behavior has been a subject of controversy. In this
age also demonstrate poor judgment in their overallstudy, the human amygdala was monitored by func-
behavior. For example, monkeys with such lesions havetional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while sub-
increased tendency to approach risky objects in their
jects were playing in a naturalistic choice paradigm
environment (Kluver and Bucy, 1939; Zola-Morgan et
against the experimenter. In order to win, players had
al., 1991). Humans were found to have impaired social
to occasionally choose to bluff their opponent, risk behavior (Tranel and Hyman, 1990) and were unable to
“getting caught,” and suffer a loss. A critical period, recognize negative facial expressions, a crucial skill in
when choice has been made but outcome was still judging risky social situations and evaluating prospec-
unknown, activated the amygdala preferentially fol- tive interactions (Adolphs et al., 1995, 1998).
lowing the choice that entailed risk of loss. Thus, the Functional brain imaging provides a tool for studying
response of the amygdala differentiated between sub- the intact human amygdala and, thus, for examining its
ject’s covert choice of either playing fair or foul. These role in choice behavior. Several studies have demon-
results support a role of the amygdala in choice behav- strated amygdala involvement in processing the nega-
ior, both in the appraisal of inherent value of choice tive valence of stimuli (Morris et al., 1996, 1999; Breiter
and the signaling of prospective negative outcomes. et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1997; Schneider et al., 1997;
Whalen et al., 1998; Rotshtein et al., 2001). Imaging stud-
Introduction ies that have directly examined the role of amygdala
in choice behavior have primarily employed classical
Choices often involve risk and uncertainty. To what ex- conditioning or gambling paradigms. Using a condition-
tent making a choice incorporates affective processing ing paradigm in fMRI, it was shown that activation in the
has been long debated in decision theory (Mellers et al., amygdala was greatest at the initial phase of acquisition
1997, 1999; Damasio, 1994). Making a choice calls for and at extinction of emotional learning (LaBar et al.,
1998; Buchel et al., 1998). The rapid habituation ob-appraisal of the expected outcome relating to different
served in this paradigm led to the suggestion that theoptions. Such evaluation prior to and immediately fol-
amygdala is most sensitive to the novel affective aspectlowing a choice usually evokes distinct affect. This can
of a signal, such as in the initial stage of learning a
conditioned choice behavior. Recently, it has been5 Correspondence: talma@tasmc.health.gov.il
shown that the amygdala could be activated by the6 Present address: Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences,
threat of a negative outcome, suggesting that it is notMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
02139. only related to the learning phase but rather to actual
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expression of a fear-conditioned response (Phelps et the opponent’s response (show or no-show) (Figure 1D).
al., 2001). Similarly, it has been demonstrated that the Note that only for a nonmatch choice the player can
amygdala is involved in evaluating the value and likeli- suffer an actual loss. Therefore, a nonmatch chip can
hood of a monetary or abstract outcome (Breiter et al., be regarded as a foul choice, while a match chip can be
2001; Zalla et al., 2000, respectively). regarded as a fair choice. The present game paradigm is
Evaluation of a prospective negative outcome and the unique, as it required that the subject actively make
response to its occurrence are not exclusively mediated choices that determined the progress of the situation,
by the amygdala. Rather, these processes involve sev- and then required an ongoing involvement of the experi-
eral other brain regions, such as the prefrontal cortex, menter in imposing uncertainty about the consequence
anterior cingulate, parietal cortex, hippocampus, and of each choice. Our specific interest was whether the
ventral striatum (LaBar et al., 1998; Buchel et al., 1998; amygdala response following each choice—but before
Critchley et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2000; Breiter et al., the outcome was known—would reveal the subject’s
2001; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Knight et al., 1999; Zalla covert choice. We hypothesized that amygdala activa-
et al., 2000; Rogers et al., 1999; Elliott et al., 1997, 2000; tion would reflect affective states related to both the
Leon and Shadlen, 1999). Recently, a disconnection value of the choice acted upon and the prospective
study in monkeys indicated that motivational choice be- opponent’s response.
havior, guided by the value of the outcome, is primarily
dependent on the effective interaction between the Results
amygdala and orbital prefrontal cortex (Baxter et al.,
2000). Thus, it is still an open question in what way the Behavioral Analysis of the Game
amygdala, a major limbic junction, is pivotal for making The subjective experience reported by the subjects fol-
an advantageous choice under uncertainty and risk. Be- lowing the scan was that they were eager to win the
chara et al. (1999) addressed this question by measuring game and tried to make advantageous choices to
SCRs during a gambling task in patients with localized achieve that goal. An analysis of the players’ choices
lesions in either the amygdala or ventromedial prefrontal revealed that on the average subjects chose equally
(VMPF) cortex. It was found that both intact amygdala between match and nonmatch chips throughout the
and VMPF cortex were necessary for effective goal- game. Figure 2A depicts the players’ nonmatch choice
directed behavior, but in different ways. The amygdala index and the opponent’s show response index during
was suggested to be more critical than VMPF for dealing the game (see Experimental Procedures for details on
adaptively with affective aspects of the decision the measurements). The players’ choices and the oppo-
process. nent’s responses on average comprised of equal
In this study, the intact amygdala response was moni- amounts of each option (match versus nonmatch and
tored directly by fMRI while subjects played an inter- show versus no-show, respectively). The averaged cal-
active modified domino game against the experimenter. culated player’s nonmatch choice index across all
The subject (player) was actually involved in naturalistic games was 0.513 (0.331 SD), and the averaged calcu-
choice behavior that was guided by the abstract goal
lated opponent’s show response index was 0.566 (0.341
of winning against the experimenter (opponent). In order
SD). Nonetheless, there was a trend for the opponent
to win the game, the player was sometimes forced to
to become biased to respond more with “Show” as the
bluff the opponent, thereby taking the risk of getting
game duration approached 5 min (Figure 2A, black line).caught and suffering an expected loss. The game thus
Accordingly, a one-way ANOVA of opponent’s show re-led to making untruthful choices that were associated
sponse index by minutes of game revealed a significantwith greater risk.
effect of time (F[4, 195]  3.214, p  0.0139). This biasThe player’s choices and the opponent’s responses
was also expressed as a statistically significant differ-were interactively determined by the flow of the game,
ence between the show index of the fifth minute and thecreating a natural progression of a game situation that
hypothesized mean of 0.5 for a nonbiased opponent’slasted approximately 5 min, or until one of the sides
responses between show and no-show (t[14]  2.493,won. Figure 1 illustrates the requirements and options
p  0.05). In contrast, for the player’s nonmatch choiceduring one round of the game (see Experimental Proce-
index there was no significant change with time (F[4,dures for details and Supplemental Data at http://
195]  0.615, p  0.652), and it persisted throughoutwww.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/33/6/983/DC1 infor-
around the average choice index of 0.5 (Figure 2A, lightmation for a short demo of the game). At the beginning
gray line). In order to further explore the relationshipof the game, one master chip and twelve game chips
between the player’s choice and opponent’s response,were assigned to the player’s board. In order to win, the
a two-way ANOVA was performed with opponent’s re-player had to get rid of all the assigned chips as quickly
sponse (show index) and game duration (minutes) asas possible. At each round of the game, the player was
factors and player’s choice (nonmatch index) as therequired to choose a chip from the board. The opponent
dependant variable. The main effect and interactionwas blind to the choice made. A chosen chip could be
were not significant, suggesting that the players’ re-either a match or a nonmatch relative to the master chip
sponses did not change as a function of the opponent’s(Figure 1A, red arrow). A nonmatch was a chip for which
responses.neither of the numbers matched the numbers on the mas-
An additional aspect of game progression was definedter chip. Then, the opponent could either ask the player
with respect to the number of chips left for the subjectto expose the chosen chip or continue with the game.
to get rid of representing the asset position (see Experi-Thus, the outcome of each round depended on the com-
bination of the player’s choice (match or nonmatch) and mental Procedures for details). As expected, high asset
Amygdala Signals Prospective Outcome of Choice
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Figure 1. Game Course
Diagram indicating the temporal sequence of steps as driven by the interaction between the player and the opponent during one round in
the game. The steps were divided by visually and aurally presented commands shown in gray rectangles (see Experimental Procedures for
detailed description of game progress and additional information for a game demo). A representative round is depicted, where the master
chip is horizontally positioned on the game board (glass-like rectangle). At the beginning of a round, the command “Choose” directs the
player to mentally choose a chip from the chips assigned to him (depicted on the bottom of the board). After the command “Ready,” the
player is required to move the cursor to mark his chosen chip. Following the command “Go,” the player is required to actually pick it and
waits for the opponent’s response. Having observed the subject making his choice, the opponent can ask the subject to expose the chosen
chip or not to expose the chip and continue to the next turn. Accordingly, three intervals of interest were characterized during a round:
“decision-making” (A), “expectancy-to-outcome” (C), and “response-to-outcome” (D). The interval from the onset of the instruction “Go” until
the player’s last motor action of pick, is marked in gray (B). The “expectancy-to-outcome” interval is divided into two possible events depending
on the player’s choice: nonmatch (red) or match (blue). Subsequently, the “response-to-outcome” interval is divided into four outcomes,
depending on the two possible responses of the opponent: expose the chosen chip (filled arrows) or continue to the next turn (dotted arrows).
The actual gain or loss in each round is depicted as the number of chips subtracted or added to the chips assigned initially to the player (E).
The relative gain or loss is calculated as the difference between the gain or loss of the actual outcome and the alternative outcome (see
Experimental Procedures for details) (F). Note that the magnitude of actual outcome is greater when opponent response with a show than a
no-show, while the magnitude of counterfactual comparison (relative gain or loss) is greater when the player makes a nonmatch choice then
a match choice.
was associated with early stages of the game while low Figure 3A. There were no statistically significant differ-
asset was associated with later stages of the game. The ences between left and right amygdala for these analy-
subjects’ choice behavior did not differ according to ses. Hereafter, the data are presented as an average
asset position. This was demonstrated in a one-way for both amygdala. Events following nonmatch choices
ANOVA of choice index by asset position that was not evoked an increase in signal relative to baseline and
significant, and by comparison of the choice nonmatch were significantly different from events following match
index of the three asset positions against a hypothesized choices. This effect was significant, as demonstrated
mean of 0.5 that was also not significant (Figure 2B). by repeated measures ANOVA performed on choice
The proportional occurrences (number of occurrences type by time (image repetitions). The ANOVA revealed
in 30 s divided by total number of occurrences in the a main effect of time (F[6, 66]  3.890, p  0.005) and
game) of each asset position per minute of the game an interaction between choice and time (F[6, 66] 2.399,
are depicted in three histograms in Figure 2C. p  0.05). The signal for nonmatch choices was signifi-
cantly larger than for match choices (planned contrast
between nonmatch versus match choices for the dura-Amygdala Activation during “Expectancy-to-
tion of 7.5 s post interval onset: F  60.619, p 0.0001,Outcome” Interval
Figure 3A).Analysis of the fMRI data revealed that while the player
A general linear model (GLM) was defined using thewas expecting the outcome, the amygdala was acti-
player’s choices and opponent’s responses as pre-vated differentially depending on the type of choice (i.e.,
dictors. A GLM contrast with nonmatch choice as anonmatch or match). These results were obtained both
positive predictor was used to probe for nonmatchwhen the amygdala was identified structurally and func-
choice-related voxels. Figure 4 shows individual para-tionally (see Experimental Procedures).
metric maps for three representative subjects. SingleAveraged fMRI response during the “expectancy-to-
subject GLM analyses demonstrated robust bilateraloutcome” interval obtained from anatomically defined
region of interest (ROI) of the amygdala is presented in amygdala activation for all the subjects. The time course
Neuron
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Figure 2. Behavioral Analysis of the Game
(A) Players’ choices (gray) and opponent’s responses (black) as a function of time. Nonmatch choice index (number of nonmatch choices
divided by the number of nonmatch and match choices) and show outcome index (number of show outcomes divided by the number of show
and no-show outcomes) are plotted for each minute of the game taken from all games for all the subjects. (B) Players’ choices as a function
of asset position (see Experimental Procedures). The mean nonmatch choice index is plotted for each one of the different asset positions.
(C) Histogram of the distribution of game steps as a function of asset position. Each histogram shows the average proportion of events
occurring at different times during the game for each asset position. High asset position is shown in black, medium in gray, and low in light
gray. The error bars are standard error of the mean (SEM).
of activated voxels obtained for each subject was con- pectancy-to-outcome” interval, with greatest response
at high asset position.sistent with the results obtained in the structural ROI
(data not shown). Figure 4 also depicts a nonmatch
choice contrast obtained from 12 subjects. Both right Amygdala Activation during “Response-to-
Outcome” Intervaland left amygdala were activated (left: 26 mm3,
[22, 2, 11]; right: 13 mm3, [29, 2, 11]; p  0.05, For the “response-to-outcome” interval, percent signal
changes were first calculated from structurally defineduncorrected). Note that the smaller size of the observed
foci in the group GLM was probably due to variability ROIs of the amygdala. Because there was no difference
in signal change between the left and right amygdalain location of foci between subjects. The structurally
based definition of the amygdala clearly demonstrates for this interval, further analyses were performed on a
weighted average of the left and right amygdala. Figurethis variability (see Table 1).
In order to test whether the amygdala activation dur- 5A shows the data sorted by four possible outcomes
and averaged across 7.5 s post opponent’s responseing the “expectancy-to-outcome” interval changed as
a function of the number of chips left for the subject to (Figure 1E).
A repeated measures ANOVA across hemispheresget rid of, fMRI signal was evaluated for each asset
position and choice type (Figure 3B). The difference was performed with player’s choice and opponent’s re-
sponse as factors. There was a main effect of oppo-between fMRI signal for choice options (i.e., match ver-
sus nonmatch) decreases from high to low asset posi- nent’s response (F[1, 11]  8.376, p  0.05), but not a
main effect of player’s choice or interaction. In addition,tion. However, no interaction between choice type and
asset position was found (two-ways ANOVA: main effect planned comparisons revealed a statistically significant
difference for show versus no-show outcomes col-of choice type F[1, 366]  16.936, p  0.000, and main
effect of asset position F[2, 366]  4.375, p  0.05). lapsed across subject’s choices (F  20.289, p  0.01,
Figure 5A), such that the opponent’s response of showTaken together, this analysis demonstrated increased
amygdala response to nonmatch choices during the “ex- evoked a greater response than the no-show response.
Amygdala Signals Prospective Outcome of Choice
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Figure 3. Amygdala Activation during the
“Expectancy-to-Outcome” Interval
The graphs depict the averaged activation
obtained from the amygdala region of interest
bilaterally from all subjects. (A) Percent signal
change is shown as a function of time for
nonmatch (red) and match (blue) choices. The
onset of the interval is set by the player’s pick
of a chosen chip and ended by the opponent
response (either “Show” or “Choose”). Dark
gray area represents the average duration of
this interval while light gray represents the
maximal duration. (B) Averaged percent sig-
nal change obtained during expectancy inter-
val for match (blue) and nonmatch (red)
events sorted by asset position in the game
(i.e., low, medium, and high; see Experimental
Procedures for details). The error bars are
standard error of the mean (SEM).
A GLM contrast with show response (following either pectancy-to-outcome” interval and therefore were di-
rectly influenced by different preinterval signal ampli-match or nonmatch choices) as a positive predictor was
used to probe for show-related voxels in the amygdala. tudes. Moreover, the no-show outcome events were
not perfectly symmetrical to the show outcome events,Both left and right amygdala contributed to the individu-
ally described signal change during the “response-to- since the player immediately started to mentally select
the next chip for the former, but had about 7.5 s to waitoutcome” interval. Figure 6 depicts individual paramet-
ric maps obtained for three representative subjects. The for the new round to begin (choose) following a show for
the latter. This does not dismiss the possibility, however,time course obtained from the show-related voxels was
consistent with the results obtained in the ROI analysis that the player used this lag between rounds to start
making his next decision.for each subject (data not shown). The show effect of
the group is demonstrated in a multistudy GLM for 12
subjects (Figure 6; left: 741 mm3 [24, 6, 10]; right: Discussion
577 mm3 [21, 6, 12]; p  0.02 uncorrected). Note
that a direct comparison between nonmatch and match “Expectancy-to-Outcome”: Anticipated Emotions
While the player was expecting the outcome, there waschoices was not possible since they occurred following
different temporal dynamics of the amygdala at the “ex- a differential activation of the amygdala according to the
Figure 4. Parametric Maps for Nonmatch Choice Related Voxels during the “Expectancy-to-Outcome” Interval
Parametric maps of preferentially activated voxels following nonmatch choices and before outcome is known, overlaid on anatomical coronal
sections. Three representative subjects’ maps are shown in addition to a group average (n  12). Significant activation within the predefined
amygdala region is marked in yellow.
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Table 1. Amygdala Region of Interest
Left Amygdala Right Amygdala
Subject Size x y z Size x y z
BP 1440 25 4 14 3465 26.5 3 12.5
CP 4522 18.5 4.5 12 3672 18 2.5 12
CN 7128 20 4.5 15 6426 20.5 4.5 15.5
EE 5610 21 5.5 12.5 4522 21.5 5 14
GB 4356 22.5 5 12.5 3213 19.5 5 16
HB 3888 20 5 17 5400 20.5 7 15.5
LS 7560 19.5 6 12 9200 20.5 4 14.5
LU 5083 19.5 7.5 13 3388 18 6 14
QE 10164 20 5 15 4199 19.5 2 16.5
QT 5980 19.5 6 17 5304 20 1 16.5
SQ 4224 19.5 4.5 13.5 2160 18.5 3.5 12.5
SA 4860 20.5 8 17 7182 24 9.5 17.5
Anatomically defined voxels 5401.25  2092.203 20.5 5.5 14.2 4844.25  1910.11 20.6 4.4 14.8
For each subject, the size (mm3) and center of gravity (in Talairach space) of the region of interest is depicted.
type of chip chosen by the player. Following a nonmatch a nonmatch chip). However, this pattern of amygdala
response could also represent affective proposition re-choice, there was a positive response in the amygdala
that was significantly larger then the response observed lated to prospective response of the opponent (show
or no-show) and consequently the possible outcomesfollowing a match choice (Figure 3A, Figure 4). Such
differential amygdala responses occurred before the (loss or gain, small or large). The affective characteristic
of a nonmatch choice could be related to guilt evokedoutcome was known, thus revealing the subject’s covert
choice to play fair or foul (i.e., choosing a match or by its untruthful value or to the tension evoked by the
Figure 5. Amygdala Activation during the
“Response-to-Outcome” Interval
Average activation obtained from the amyg-
dala region of interest bilaterally for all sub-
jects. (A) Averaged activation for the 7.5 s
after either the “Show” outcome (filled) or
“Choose” (dotted) as a function of subject
choice (nonmatch in red and match in blue).
(B) Time course of the amygdala region acti-
vation during the “response-to-outcome” in-
terval following a show outcome, and (C) no-
show (“Choose”) outcome. The error bars are
standard error of the mean (SEM).
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Figure 6. Parametric Maps for Show Outcome Related Voxels during the “Response-to-Outcome” Interval
Parametric maps of voxels preferentially activated following a show outcome are overlaid on coronal sections. Three representative subjects’
maps are shown in addition to a group average (n  12). Significant activation within the predefined amygdala region is marked in yellow.
risk of being exposed and the subsequent loss. In the regret (with choice) or disappointment (without choice)
could account for the amygdala larger activation to pro-present game paradigm, players were forced to occa-
sionally make a nonmatch choice; thus, it is unlikely that spective negative outcome. Direct experimental com-
parison between “expectancy-to-outcome” with andthey felt guilty about it. However, they could have felt
shame for the prospect of “being caught” when bluffing. without choice would further delineate the contribution
of the value of choice by itself to the amygdala response.The risk of greater loss following a nonmatch choice
could also provoke negative emotion that would influ- The observed hypersensitivity of amygdala to nega-
tive anticipated emotions are in accord with findings inence the amygdala response. In our game paradigm,
both choices entailed risk of loss, although of different awake cats, showing increased firing rate and greater
neuronal synchronization in the lateral amygdala duringmagnitudes (i.e., large loss following a request to show
a nonmatch choice versus a small loss when not re- anticipation of noxious stimuli (Pare and Collins, 2000).
In another study, unit recordings in rats indicated thatquested to show a match choice; Figures 1E and 1F).
Therefore, it is suggested that the amygdala is most neurons in the amygdala signal not only the value of an
already received reinforcement, but also the expectancyaffected by the prospective magnitude of loss and not
just by a risk of any loss. to negative outcome even before learning has been es-
tablished. Moreover, the majority of neurons in theAccording to the somatic marker hypothesis, risky
choices evoke anticipatory SCRs that represent the af- amygdala fired more when a negative outcome was ex-
pected than when a positive outcome was expectedfective attributes in the process of decision-making (Da-
masio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). Moreover, decision (Schoenbaum et al., 1998). It was proposed that such
prelearning differential amygdala activity to prospectiveaffect theory suggests that it is not the actual emotion,
but rather anticipated emotion, that interacts with the value of outcome provides an important cue for avoiding
aversive outcomes in the early stages of learning. Ourchoice process. More specifically, it proposes that risky
choices evoke anticipated emotions that relate to either subjects participated in an over-learned risky choice
behavior, and no strategy seemed to be acquiredregret (a feeling evoked by considering the player’s own
choice) or disappointment (a feeling evoked by consid- throughout the game by the player (Figure 2A). Thus,
the specific response of the amygdala to expected largeering alternative options of the opponent’s response)
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1986; Loomes et al., 1989; negative outcome was obtained beyond the learning
phase of the game. Such data provide additional supportMellers et al., 1997, 1999).
Recently, another study demonstrated greater posi- for the claim that the human amygdala is involved in the
actual expression and not solely in the acquisition oftive response of the amygdala when subjects were pre-
sented with the prospect of a bad monetary outcome anticipated negative emotions (Phelps et al., 2001; Be-
chara et al., 1995).(Breiter et al., 2001). This study and our data suggest
that the amygdala is involved in the process of attaching Furthermore, amygdala damage has been shown to
lead to difficulty in making advantageous choices underaffect to appraisal of prospective negative outcome.
However, the origin of this affect in each study might uncertainty in a gambling task with a monetary outcome
(Bechara et al., 1999). This difficulty corresponded to abe different. In our study, subjects were engaged in
active choice behavior between fair and foul that deter- lack of anticipatory SCRs before choosing from a disad-
vantageous card deck. It was assumed that the impair-mined the dominating negative valence of the prospec-
tive outcome; thus, their main anticipated emotion was ment in making an advantageous choice in these pa-
tients was related to their inability to encode andmost likely regret (Mellers et al., 1999). In the Breiter et
al. (2001) study, subjects did not make any choice. Thus, anticipate the negative value of an outcome that is re-
lated to their choice and, thus, to avoid it. Our fMRI datatheir negative anticipated emotions could be mainly dis-
appointment (Mellers et al., 1999). Therefore, depending support this proposal by showing that the strongest
activation of the intact amygdala occurred while sub-on the involvement of active choice, either anticipated
Neuron
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jects expected the outcome of largest negative magni- change his choice pattern according to the opponent
response.tude. This outcome was directly related to their risky
choice of bluffing the opponent.
“Response-to-Outcome”: Sensitivity
to Opponent’s Response“Expectancy-to-Outcome”: Value of Choice
Following either match or nonmatch choices, the amyg-Anticipated negative emotions were assumed to be as-
dala was more activated when the opponent asked thesociated with, and possibly generated by, a cognitive
player to reveal the chosen chip (show outcome) thanprocess of inferring subjective value to a choice in terms
when was not (no-show outcome) (Figure 5A). Thus, inof loss or gain probability and cost (Kahneman and Tver-
contrast to the “expectancy-to-outcome” interval, dur-sky, 1979). However, this perceived value of choice
ing the “response-to-outcome” the amygdala was tunedcould have changed with game progression. Interest-
more to the type of opponent’s response than the play-ingly enough, in our study, when events during the “ex-
er’s choice. Accordingly, amygdala response seems topectancy-to-outcome” interval were divided according
correspond to the magnitude of the outcome rather thanto their asset positions, there was a significant asset
to its direction (gain or loss). As is shown in Figure 1E,effect in addition to the choice effect (Figure 3B). Amyg-
the magnitude of gain or loss of show outcome wasdala response following a nonmatch choice decreased
greater than that of the no-show outcome, irrespectivewith asset changing from high (many chips left to be
of the subject’s choice (match or nonmatch). Further-disposed) to low (few chips left to be disposed). Further-
more, the amygdala response did not seem to correlatemore, the difference in activation between match and
with the possible valence of experienced emotions duenonmatch choices was getting smaller as asset de-
to counterfactual comparisons (Mellers et al., 1999). Acreased. Based on this finding, it is tempting to suggest
counterfactual comparison can be regarded as the pro-that the amygdala response while the subject was ex-
cess of comparing the actual with the alternative out-pecting the outcome was affected not only by the ex-
come. For example, in the case of the opponent’spected magnitude of immediate negative outcome, but
“Show” request, the experienced emotion could be ei-also by the size of asset. Asset position in the game
ther of positive valence (i.e., satisfaction) when it followscould reflect the likelihood of winning the game. At low
a match choice, or of negative valence (i.e., disappoint-asset position where the game seems to be close to the
ment) when it follows a nonmatch choice. Such relativelyend, match and nonmatch choices would be perceived
low sensitivity of the amygdala to valence of outcomeas similarly critical for winning the game. Thus, it is
is in accordance with animal and human data suggestingsuggested that the amygdala is most sensitive to the
a role for the amygdala in evoking somatic responsesdifference between choices when the player is more
to both punishment and reward (Hatfield et al., 1996;engaged in immediate outcome evaluation (i.e., high or
Bechara et al., 1999). Moreover, recent fMRI studiesmedium asset position). In fact, most of our subjects
showed a change in activation of the amygdala withreported after scanning that when they reached the
magnitude of either loss or gain in gambling tasks (Zallastage of having fewer chips (i.e., low asset position) they
et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001).felt less anxious about the outcome of every step and
The value of outcome could also be affected for betterwere more focused on achieving their final goal of win-
or worse by the magnitude of the alternative outcomening the game. Thus, the change in the value of choice
(i.e., represented by the difference between the actualcould be accountable for the decrease in amygdala re-
and alternative outcomes). In our game, the largest rela-sponse at low asset position. Altogether, the asset anal-
tive loss was experienced following show nonmatch (seeysis proposes that human amygdala may be most effec-
Experimental Procedures; Figure 1F). Although thetive at signaling the value of a choice with respect to
amygdala response was slightly larger for show non-the immediate expected outcome.
match than show match, it was not statistically signifi-There are, however, two alternative interpretations for
cant (Figure 5A). Hence, overall there was no effect ofthe asset effect. It could either be the mere effect of
relative outcome. This finding is in agreement with aprolonging the game, or a tendency of the opponent to
previous study showing that different magnitudes ofrespond more with the show option toward the end
counterfactual comparisons, even when determined byof game. The effect of lengthening the game could be
the experimental paradigm and not by the subject, didrelated to the known neural habituation phenomenon in
not affect the amygdala response to outcome (Breiterthe amygdala. It was suggested that such habituation
et al., 2001). We conclude that the actual magnitude ofreflects the role of the amygdala as predictor of the
outcome was more likely to contribute to the amygdalavalue of choice in terms of outcome in a novel situation
response than valence or magnitude of counterfactual(Quirk et al., 1997; Buchel et al., 1998; LaBar et al., 1998).
comparisons. However, in the current study the magni-However, the pattern of activation of match choices
tude of actual outcome and type of opponent’s responsedemonstrates an increase in activation from medium to
were dovetailed and therefore it was not possible tolow asset. Thus, it seems less likely that this effect can
characterize their specific contribution.be explained solely by habituation. The second interpre-
tation posits that the change in the opponent’s response
pattern affected the amygdala response. Nonetheless, Amygdala Response throughout the Game:
From Motivation to Actionsimilar nonmatch choice index of the player at the three
asset positions (Figure 2B) and the lack of correspon- In this study, the profile of amygdala activation was
characterized during an interactive game, by either thedence between player’s choice and opponent’s re-
sponse (Figure 2A) demonstrate that the player did not player’s choice (expectancy interval) or the opponent’s
Amygdala Signals Prospective Outcome of Choice
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One male subject was excluded from the final analysis due to sub-response (outcome interval). In a SCRs companion
stantial artifacts in the MR BOLD signal (see below).study (see Supplemental Data at http://www.neuron.
org/cgi/content/full/33/6/983/DC1) an overall effect of
Game Rules and Objectivesplayer’s choice was demonstrated during both expec-
The domino game presented below is a two-person game with dia-
tancy and outcome intervals. This finding suggests that metrically opposed preferences. In the game, the subject is the
the choice-dependant response of the amygdala during player and the experimenter is the opponent. There are twenty-eight
the “expectancy-to-outcome” interval was correlated domino chips, where each chip is composed of two numbers from
zero to six (all possible combinations of 0, 1, …, 6 without repeti-with arousal and thus could fit with the somatic marker
tions). In the beginning of each game, twelve random chips arehypothesis of decision-making. On the other hand, the
assigned to the player and placed face up at the bottom of theamygdala response to outcome was different from the
board, four undisclosed chips are assigned to the bank, and one
SCRs by not being related to player’s choice. This dis- chip is placed face up on the board and is the master chip. No other
crepancy calls for an additional nonarousal related chips are used. Each assigned chip can be either a match or a
mechanism that could inflect the amygdala response in nonmatch relative to the master chip. A match is a chip in which at
least one number out of the two matches one of the numbers onchoice behavior in respect to actual outcome.
the master chip (lower arrow, Figure 1A). A nonmatch is a chip inOne possible explanation for the difference between
which none of the numbers on it matches the numbers on the masterfMRI and SCRs data could be related to the extensive
chip (upper arrow, Figure 1A). Approximately half of the assigned
interconnections between the amygdala and prefrontal chips will be nonmatch. To win the game, the player has to get rid
cortex. It has been shown that when the amygdala and of all the chips assigned to him. One round in the game can be
orbital prefrontal cortex were disconnected, monkeys described in terms of the following steps:
were unable to adjust their choice behavior when facing
(1) Each round starts with the command “Choose.” The playerchange in values of the reward outcomes. In contrast,
then makes one of two decisions called pick match choice
the disconnection did not affect motivation to avoid or pick nonmatch choice.
aversive stimuli and to prefer food reinforcement. These (2) Following the command “Ready,” the player moves the cur-
findings support the established idea that motivational sor to the chosen chip.
(3) Following the command “Go,” the player picks the chip assignificance is coded by the amygdala and then trans-
quickly as possible. Once picked, the chip is automaticallyferred to prefrontal cortex for the control of action
placed facedown on the game board (demonstrated by the(Schoenbaum et al., 1998).
curved arrows, Figure 1C).
Effective interactions between the amygdala and pre- (4) Having observed the player make his pick, the opponent
frontal cortex have been proposed to be critical for ap- makes one of two decisions called show and no-show.
propriate social behavior (Rolls, 1999). Clearly, this is (5) If the opponent decides no-show, the round is over and the
command “Choose” is presented (step 1). If he decides todependent on sufficiently active amygdala. Monkeys
ask the subject to expose the chip, the command “Show” iswith bilateral lesions of the amygdala exhibited inappro-
presented and the chip is turned face up. If it is a nonmatch,priate responses to social stimuli rather than difficulties
the player will get the chip back and two additional chips
in actual emotional expression (Meunier et al., 1999). In (from the bank or randomly from the previously disposed
humans, damage to the amygdala is characterized not chips if the bank is empty). If it is a match, one additional
only by inappropriate emotional behavior, but also by chip from the chips assigned to the player is randomly picked
and moved to the board.a tendency to impose danger on the self and others
(Bechara et al., 1999). Correspondingly, an abnormal
Rounds in the game continue until the player got rid of all of his
response of the amygdala during an aversive condition- chips (win), or either 320 s have passed (lose) or the player got all
ing task was found in antisocial personality disorder the chips from the bank and the board (i.e., there are no more chips
(Schneider et al., 2000). In the current study, the tuning for him to get and therefore he loses).
The first two steps of a round are both of fixed duration (5 s). Theof the amygdala to the player’s choice on the one hand
duration of the third step is determined by the player’s responseand to the opponent’s response on the other hand un-
time after the “Go” command. The average response time was 829derscores its significance in shaping appropriate social
ms (328.259 SD) where response times for nonmatch were not signif-
behavior. For example, the observed sensitivity of the icantly different from match choices (Nonmatch: 812 ms  306 SE,
amygdala to the expected value of an outcome was Match: 846 ms  361 SE; t[11]  0.913, p  0.381). Once picked,
based on previously learned rules of the game. In addi- the chosen chip is placed facedown beside the master chip (demon-
strated by curved arrows, Figure 1C). Subsequently, the player wastion, the response to the actual magnitude of the out-
waiting for the opponent’s response for 5–10 s (step 4, “expectancy-come was related to the type of opponent’s response,
to-outcome” interval, Figure 1C). Note that the duration of this inter-suggesting that the amygdala is involved in evaluating
val was not of fixed duration and was controlled by the opponent’s
possible outcome of choice. Taken together, the data response. The average duration of the “expectancy-to-outcome”
suggest that the amygdala is capable of directing moti- interval was 6394 ms (748 SD) when followed by the “Show” com-
vation by signaling the prospective consequences of a mand, and 6701 (837 SD) when followed by “Choose” command
(no-show outcome). The duration of show and no-show outcomeschoice. Moreover, it can provide guidance for future
did not differ significantly.actions in accordance with the actual outcome of the
The number of chips removed or added to the player’s assignedchoice.
chips in a round reflects the actual gain or loss, respectively. A
relative gain or loss of a player was defined as the difference be-
Experimental Procedures tween the two possible outcomes (show and no-show) as deter-
mined by the opponent’s response (Figure 1F).
Subjects Based on the player’s choice and the opponent’s response, there
Thirteen right-handed healthy subjects (seven females; aged 18–46) were four possible outcomes (step 5, “response-to-outcome” inter-
participated in the experiment. Subjects provided written informed val, Figures 1D and 1E, from top to bottom):
consent prior to the scanning session. All procedures were approved
by the Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center human rights committee. (1) Show nonmatch: The player chose a nonmatch chip and was
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asked to show it. As a consequence, the player suffers a loss asset classes. The high and low asset classes comprised 10% and
12% of the remaining game rounds, respectively.by getting back the picked chip plus two additional chips
(i.e., 2). The player has a relative loss of three, since he
could have disposed of one chip [i.e., (2)  (1)  3]. fMRI Experimental Procedure
(2) No-show nonmatch: The player chose a nonmatch chip and The subjects were given detailed instructions of the game’s rules
was asked to proceed with the game and choose another and practiced playing against the experimenter (I.K.) for a few
chip. This outcome is an actual gain of the one chip that was rounds. Thus, when put in the scanner the game’s rules were fully
picked (i.e., 1), but a relative gain of three because the learned. The same experimenter (I.K.) ran all sessions and played
nonmatch choice was not exposed [i.e., (1)  (2)  3]. against all subjects. The experimenter was blind to the specific
(3) Show match: The player chose a match chip and was asked chips assigned to the subject, as well as the choices made by the
to show it. As a consequence, the player has an actual gain subject if not exposed. The experimenter heard instructive sounds
of two, since he got disposed of the picked chip and one and, thus, knew the type of chip when the subject was asked to
additional random chip from his assigned chips (i.e., 2). expose it. The subject was aware of the fact that he played against
However, the relative gain is only one [i.e., (2)  (1)  the experimenter.
1]. The stimuli were projected onto a tangent screen mounted in front
(4) No-show match: The player chose a match chip but was of the subject’s eyes in the scanner, and viewed through a tilted
asked to proceed with the game and choose another chip. mirror. The commands for the player were presented visually by
This outcome is an actual gain of the one chip that was picked words shown on the left corner of the board and aurally via head-
(i.e., 1), but a relative loss of one chip, since the match phones. The subject played the game using a button box with three
choice was not exposed [i.e., (1)  (2)  1]. possible key-presses (move left, move right, and pick). The experi-
menter response was presented visually to the player accompanied
The utility of the player as defined by the difference between the by a characteristic sound. Game presentation and response acquisi-
show and no-show outcomes reflects the counterfactual compari- tion were controlled by a Pentium II PC using in-house software
sons (Mellers et al., 1999). In our design, outcome of a nonmatch written in Visual C and Directx3.0 (Microsoft Corp.).
choice leads to a larger counterfactual comparison magnitude (rela-
tive gain or loss of 3) than outcome of a match choice (relative gain MRI Scanning
or loss of 1). Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast was obtained
with gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR 2500,
TE  55, FA  90) on a 1.5T Signa Horizon LX 8.25 GE echospeedGame Course Analyses
scanner. In order to allow for a large number of acquisitions andEach subject (player) played an average of 4.8 games (2.03 SD) with
improve the signal-to-noise ratio, we used a small number of slicesthe same experimenter—I.K. (opponent). The average duration of a
centered on the amygdala (LaBar et al., 1998). Four functional slicesgame was 220 s (45.177 SD), where the shortest game duration was
of 5 mm thickness with 1 mm gap and the corresponding spin-echo63 s and the longest was 319 s. 83.4% of the games lasted from 3
T1 weighted anatomical images were acquired for each run (i.e.,to 5 min, where 1 min games comprised only 3.7% and 2 min games
one game). The amygdala was anatomically detected clearly in twomerely 12.9% of all games. 3, 4, and 5 min games constituted 24%,
to three slices. Considering the image resolution of fMRI and the33.4%, and 26% of all games, respectively.
signal-to-noise ratio in this area of the brain, it was not possible toThe average number of rounds per game was 10.51 (2.89 SD).
reliably sort out subregions touching the amygdala nuclei such asGames that lasted 1 min or less were considered outliers and there-
substantia innominata and periamygdaloid cortex (Breiter et al.,fore were excluded from all later behavioral and fMRI analyses (com-
1996; Whalen et al., 1998). Therefore, we only present data obtainedprised 3.7% of all games; calculated index: 0.1667  0.237 SD, not
from a predefined amygdala region (see below). A 3D spoiled gradi-shown in Figure 2A).
ent echo sequence was acquired on each subject, in order to allowThree intervals were highlighted for brain analyses: The “expec-
for volume statistical analyses of signal changes during the game.tancy-to-outcome” interval was defined as starting after the se-
lected chip was placed beside the master chip and ending when
the opponent responded (Figure 1C). The fMRI response during this Image Analysis
All fMRI data were processed using the BrainVoyager3.9 softwareinterval was sorted according to the player’s choice. To characterize
the player’s choices, a nonmatch choice index was defined as the package (http://www.brainvoyager.com) (Dierks et al., 1999; Goebel
et al., 1998). Prior to statistical analysis of signal, all functional im-division of nonmatch choices by the sum of match and nonmatch
choices. This index represents a nonbiased choice when equal to ages were evaluated for quality of EPI. One subject was excluded
from image analyses due to significant artifacts of functional images.0.5 (exactly half of the events were nonmatch choices), a biased
choice for match when smaller than 0.5 or to nonmatch when greater For each subject (n  12), the 2D functional images were superim-
posed on 2D anatomical images and incorporated into the 3D datathan 0.5.
The “response-to-outcome” interval was defined as starting after set through trilinear interpolation. The complete data set was trans-
formed into Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). Pre-pro-the opponent’s response (either a “Show” or “Choose” command,
Figure 1D), and lasting for 7.5 s (average duration of the interval: cessing of functional scans included head movement assessment
(scans with head movement of 1.5 mm were omitted), high-fre-7144 ms  749 SD). The “response-to-outcome” interval following
a “Choose” command (i.e., outcome of no-show) was similarly de- quency temporal filtering and removal of linear trends.
First, ROIs of the amygdala were defined anatomically for eachfined. Finally, for this interval fMRI events were sorted according to
the player’s choice and the opponent’s response. The opponent’s subject. Amygdala borders were determined on the axial view and
were limited by the tip of lateral ventricles. Group average for theresponses were characterized with a show outcome index. The
index was calculated by dividing the number of show outcomes by ROI approach was based on a random effects model. The average
size of the ROIs was 5401.25 mm (2092.203 SD) for the left amygdalathe sum of show and no-show outcomes.
A third interval was defined as baseline for calculation of percent and 4844.25 mm (1910.11 SD) for right amygdala. The center of the
structurally defined clusters was 20.5,5.5,14.2 and20.6,4.4,signal change (Figure 1A). The “decision-making” interval was de-
fined as starting after the command “Choose” and ending before 14.8 for left and right amygdala, respectively (see Supplemental
Data at http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/33/6/983/DC1). Ta-the “Ready” command. This interval occasionally included the “re-
sponse-to-outcome” interval following a choose outcome. ble 1 for single subject data shows the average size and center of
gravity for the individual anatomical ROIs. In addition to ROI analysis,An additional analysis was done by sorting each game round
according to the number of chips left for the subject to get rid of parametric maps were calculated separately for each subject using
a GLM (Friston et al., 1995), with game events as predictors. A(asset position). Three different asset positions were defined: (1)
low asset (# chips  4); (2) medium asset (4  # chips  12); and lag of 7.5 s (i.e., three repetitions) was used to account for the
hemodynamic response delay. Although we employed an event-(3) high asset (# chips 12). Medium asset position comprised 78%
of all game rounds and was used as a control for the two other related design, we assumed no overlap of the hemodynamic re-
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